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Au Canada, une politique publique visant à aider les parents isolés à l'aide sociale à 
s'insérer sur le marché du travail a été mise en place sur une base expérimentale   
Ainsi, plus de 4134 chefs de familles monoparentales qui étaient entrés à l'aide 
sociale entre janvier 1994 et mars 1995 ont été échantillonnés aléatoirement pour 
faire partie du projet d'Autosuffisance (PAS). Seulement 3315 d'entre eux ont 
accepté de participer à cette expérimentation alors qu'ils avaient, dans le cadre de 
l'expérience, 50% de chance de disposer d'un supplément de revenu relativement 
important mais limité dans le temps. Les personnes qui ont fait partie du groupe de 
traitement ont pu recevoir ce supplément dès lors où elles ont quitté l'aide sociale 
pour occuper un emploi à temps plein. 
Dans cet article, nous cherchons à déterminer si un refus de participer à cette 
expérience de l'ordre de 20% est susceptible d'avoir biaisé l'estimation de l'impact du 
supplément de revenu. Nous comparons l'effet estimé du traitement en utilisant 
l'échantillon expérimental seulement avec celui obtenu en utilisant des données 
additionnelles sur les individus qui ne prennent pas part à l'expérience. Nous 
écrivons la fonction de vraisemblance et obtenons une estimation de l'impact de ce 
programme sur la distribution de la durée de séjour à l'aide sociale. Nous mettons en 
évidence l'existence d'un biais de non-réponse. Nous corrigeons ce biais en tenant 
compte de la décision de participation et nous montrons que les estimations de l'effet 
du supplément de revenu obtenues à partir de l'échantillon expérimental seulement 
sous-estiment de façon importante l'impact du programme. 
 





In Canada, a policy aiming at helping single parents on social assistance become 
self-reliant was implemented on an experimental basis. The Self-Sufficiency Entry 
Effects Demonstration randomly selected a sample of 4 134 single parents who had 
applied for welfare between January 1994 and March 1995. It turned out only 3 315 
took part in the experiment despite a 50% chance of receiving a generous, time-
limited, earnings supplement conditional on finding a full-time jobs and leaving 
income assistance within a year.   
The purpose of this paper is to determine whether a non-response rate as high as 
20% is likely to bias the measurement of the treatment effect. We compare the 
estimated impact of the program using experimental data only to that obtained using 
additional data on individuals not taking part in the experiment. We write the 
likelihood of various sets of information and obtain relevant estimates of program 
impact on welfare spell durations. We find strong evidence of non-response bias in 
the data. When we correct for the bias, we find that estimates that rely on 
experimental data only significantly underestimate the true impact of the program. 
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JEL Classification: I38, J18, C41 1 Introduction
In seeking to alleviate the problems that plague particularly disadvantaged groups when inte-
grating the labour market, governments have traditionally turned to skill enhancing training
programs. By enhancing skills, it is hoped individuals will receive attractive job offers and
thus reduce their reliance on transfer programs.
Over the past twenty years, the evaluation literature has generally found training programs
to havehad limitedsuccess in achievingthesegoals (see Heckman, LaLondeand Smith(1999)
for a recent and detailed survey and Gilbert, Kamionka and Lacroix (2001) for results pertain-
ing to Canada). Indeed, only very focused programs targeted at speciﬁc groups seem to have
had any signiﬁcant impact on reliance toward support programs. Yet, decrease in reliance has
not generally translated into signiﬁcant reductions in poverty rates. One may infer from such
poor performance that training programs that were implemented over that period simply did
not manage to increase productivity to a level that would make work a better alternative to
social assistance.
Many governments have responded to such disappointing results by shying away from
traditional training programs only to contemplate policies that directly address the relative at-
tractiveness of work. By directly subsidizing wage rates, it is believed many will be induced
to accept jobs offers that would not normally be good alternatives to transfer programs such as
social assistance. Inducing individuals to work is motivated by two separate but complemen-
tary goals. First, by raising total income such policies may be more effective at addressing
poverty than traditional programs. Second, holding a regular job may be more conducive to
the acquisition of skills and attitudes that are necessary for self-reliance.
In Canada, a policy aiming at helping single parents on social assistance become self-
reliant was implemented on an experimental basis. The Self-Sufﬁciency Project (SSP) is a re-
search and demonstration project that provides a generous, time-limited, earnings supplement
to welfare recipients who ﬁnd a full-time jobs and leave income assistance. SSP consists of
two main studies: the SSP Recipients Demonstration (RD) and the SSP Entry Effects Demon-
stration (EED). The former focuses on welfare recipients who have been on welfare for at least
a year. The latter focuses on newly enrolled recipients.
The RD began in 1992 and enrolled over 9,000 volunteers. About half were randomly
offered the SSP program. The other half were not offered the supplement and constitute
the experimental control group. The EED, on the other hand, aimed at documenting so-called
delayed exit effects. Since new entrants had to stay on welfare for at least 12 months to qualify
for SSP, it was feared the supplement may entice some to remain longer on the rolls. The EED
randomly selected a sample of single parents who had applied for welfare between January
1994 and March 1995. Half of those selected were offered the supplement. Most evaluations
1of the SSP are based on the Recipients Demonstration. Nearly all of them conclude that the
program has had sizable impacts on exits from welfare (Michalopoulos, Card, Gennetian,
Harknett and Robins (2000), Quets, Robins, Paan, Michalopoulos and Card (1999)). Others
have found the program beneﬁcial to children (Morris and Michalopoulos (2000)) and to have
had ambiguous results on marital behaviour (Harknett and Gennetian (2001)).
There is little doubt the program has had signiﬁcant impacts on individual behaviour.
Because both the RD and the EED use classical random assignment designs, estimates of
program impacts rest on simple comparisons between mean responses of treatment and con-
trol groups. Such comparisons provide appropriate estimates of the “treatment effects on the
treated” only under a number of relatively stringent assumptions. One of those states that
individuals taking part in the experiment constitute a true random sample of the population
of interest. There is little discussion of experimental biases in the literature partly because
the data obtained from social experiments simply can not conﬁrm or deny that behaviour has
been disrupted in one way or another. The evidence brought to bear is almost always indirect
or inferential at best.1 It is thus important to determine whether behaviour has indeed been
affected by the experimentation and if so, whether behavioural disruptions have contaminated
the estimated impacts.
The purpose of this paper is to document the extent of non-response bias in the SSP exper-
iment and to propose a measure of the impact of such bias, if any. Our analysis focuses on the
EED because the non-response rate was much higher than in the RD (20% vs 5%).2 Our strat-
egy is thus to compare the estimated impact of the program using experimental data only to
those obtained using additional data on individuals not taking part in the experiment. Reasons
for not participating are threefold. First, some recipients were simply not selected at baseline.
This sample can be thought of as a legitimate control group for the purpose of the experiment.
Second, some were selected but refused to participate. Finally, some were selected but could
not be reached at baseline. Since we know the probability of being in each sample, we can
write the likelihood of various sets of information and obtain relevant estimates of program
impact on welfare spell durations. Our results are consistent with those of Berlin, Bancroft,
Card, Lin and Robins (1998) in ﬁnding little evidence of delayed exits, if any. Furthermore,
we ﬁnd strong evidence of non-response bias in the data. When we properly correct for the
bias, we ﬁnd that the estimates that rely on experimental data alone underestimate the true
impact of the program.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a detailed descrip-
tion of the Entry Effects Demonstration. Section 2.1 describes the data on both participants
1See Heckman (1992) for a discussion of randomization biases.
2As many as 4,134 individuals were contacted for the EED. Yet, only 3,326 completed the baseline survey,
and an additional 9 asked to be removedfrom the experimentafter completingthe survey. Thus the response rate
is about 80%.
2and non-participants in the EED. Non-parametric evidence on delayed exits is presented as
well. Section 3 discusses the statistical model and the treatment of unobserved individual
heterogeneity. Section 4 reports our main ﬁndings. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The Entry Effects Demonstration
Economists have long recognized that policies that provide a conditional earnings supplement
may have the unintended consequence of inducing some to modify their behaviour in order to
become eligible. There is very littleempirical evidence to supportthisclaim. Moststudies that
focus on so-called “entry effects” are based on simulation models (Mofﬁtt (1992, 1996)) that
have nevertheless been shown to perform relatively well at predicting inﬂows and outﬂows
from welfare caseloads (Garasky and Barnow (1992)).
The Self-Sufﬁciency Project was introduced in Canada in 1992. It aimed at measuring the
responseof long-termwelfare recipientstoa ﬁnancialincentivethatmadework paybetterthan
welfare. SSP offered a generous, time-limited,monthlycash paymenttoeligiblesingleparents
in British Columbia and New Brunswick who found full-time jobs and left welfare. The
supplement was available only to those who had remained on welfare for at least 12 months.
This feature of the program and the (relative) generosity of the supplement were thought to
potentially give rise to two types of entry effects. The ﬁrst, “unconditional” effect, is to induce
single parents to join the welfare rolls and become eligible. The second, “conditional” effect,
is to induce those currently on the rolls to delay their exit from welfare in order to become
eligible.
Designing an experiment to measure unconditional entry effects is not feasible since it
would require a very large sample and involve huge implementation costs. On the other hand,
measuring delayed exit behaviour through a social experiment is much more feasible. The
Entry Effects Demonstration thus utilized a random sample of single parents who had applied
for and received Income Assistance (IA) between January 1994 and March 1995 in British
Columbia.3 Selected individuals who agreed to be part of the experiment were interviewed
at home to complete the baseline survey. They were also asked to sign an informed consent
form that explained the nature of the experiment, described the random assignment process,
and stated that all individual-level data would be kept conﬁdential. The agreement also gave
researchers access to administrative records on income assistance from the British Columbia
Ministry of Social Services. Immediately after the baseline interview, individuals were ran-
domly assigned to either the program or the control group. Program members were sent a
3To be considered as new entrants, applicants had not to have received IA in the six previous months. A
signiﬁcant minority (31%) had nevertheless received IA at some time in the two years prior to their current
application (Berlin et al. (1998)).
3letter and brochure explaining their potential eligibility to an earnings supplement. They were
reminded that they had to remain on welfare for at least 12 months to qualify for the supple-
ment and that upon qualiﬁcation, they had to ﬁnd a full-time job within the next 12 months.
They were also mailed a “reminder” six to seven months after their baseline interview.
2.1 Data
As mentioned earlier, our empirical strategy consists of using information on individuals who
were not in the experiment to assess the existence of non-response bias. Statistics Canada,
the data collection contractor, agreed to provide us individual IA histories on participants and
non-participants alike using administrative ﬁles.
The original sample was ﬁelded between January 1994 and March 1995. Each month, an
independent random sample from the population of welfare applicants was selected. To be
included in the experimental sample, individuals had not to have received welfare payments
for at least 6 months prior to applying for beneﬁts. Statistics Canada used the same algorithm
to generate the sample of non-participants.4 For conﬁdentiality reasons, the data was restricted
in two ways. First, only information on the ﬁrst welfare spell was made available. Second,
those who had refused to take part in the experiment were included in the population not
sampled at baseline.5
The sampling scheme and the data at our disposal are illustrated in Figure 1. The original
sample comprised over 4,337 individuals. Of those, 139 were declared out-of-scope, i.e. they
were sampled by mistake, 56 were eventually excluded for the same reason, and an additional
8 asked to be removed from the study. This leaves a total of 4,134 individuals. Of these, 3,315
agreed to sign the informed consent form and complete the baseline survey. The response
rate is thus approximately equal to 80%. Of the original sample, 694 individuals could either
not be contacted at baseline (307) or were not followed up (387). We refer to this group as
4Randomization occurred during the ﬁrst month following application for beneﬁts in most cases. Indeed, as
many as 2,464 individuals had either received no or one IA payment at randomization. Another 653 individuals
had received two monthly payments. Finally, 92 individuals had received as many as three or four payments
prior to assignment. We use the randomization date as the starting date for the experimental sample since this
corresponds to the beginning of the treatment. We acknowledge, though, that this will tend to decrease the
average duration of the experimental sample.
5Statistics Canada estimates that 8% of the original sample either refused to sign the informed consent, asked
to be removed from the project or did not agree to have their data included in any parts of the study. These


























Figure 1: Randomization Scheme
sample C.6 Finally, 122 individualsrefused to take part in the experiment.7 The randomization
procedure yielded the experimental treatment and control groups (henceforth samples A and
B, respectively).
Statistics Canada provided us a sample of 3,073 individuals sampled among those not
contacted at baseline or who refused to be in the experiment. We refer to this group as sample
D.8 Those who have refused are not identiﬁable in the data. As such sample D is a complex
mix of groups A, B and C. Indeed, among those in D, some would have joined the experiment
(A+B) had they been selected, others would not have been contacted for different reasons (C),
and still others would have refused to take part into the experiment. Under the null assumption
that the data is void of non-response bias, groups B and D should behave in a similar manner.
If it is found that there are systematic differences, it will be necessary to investigate whether
the treatment effect is biased.
6Although Statistics Canada documents show that 694 individuals were not contacted or followed up at base-
line, the sample we were provided contains only 637 observations. Further, we have no information on the
individual status in the sample.
7It is very likely that those who were not followed up also refused to take part in the experiment.
8The total populationofwelfare applicantsoverthe periodcoveredbythe EED is 7,390. Thus, samples A,B,C
and D represent over 95% of the total population.
52.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for each sample separately.9 The ﬁrst two columns show
that the experimental treatment and control groups are very similar in terms of observable
characteristics. This is not surprising since treatment is randomly assigned among those who
agree to take part in the experiment. Individuals in sample D are also very similar to those of
samples A and B. On the other hand, sample C stands out as containing proportionately more
men, and slightly younger individuals with fewer children. Although not reported in the table,
women in sample C are somewhat younger than those of other samples whereas the converse
holds for men. In all samples, male-headed households have signiﬁcantly fewer children than
female-headed households.
Table 2 indicates that the mean IA spell duration is relatively similar for individuals in
samples A, B and D. Those in sample C have a signiﬁcantly shorter mean and median dura-
tions. Finally, note that although we observe individual IA histories for over 65 months, more
than 9.6% of all spells are censored.
To better ascertain the extent to which observable characteristics differ between samples
A, B, C and D, we report simple logit regressions of belonging to a given sample in Table 3.
For example, column (1) reports the parameter estimates of the probability of belonging to
sample A when samples A and B are pooled together. As expected, all parameter estimates
turn out not to be statistically signiﬁcant. Likewise, columns (2) and (3) show that samples A,
B and D are very homogeneous. Indeed, only the intercepts are statistically signiﬁcant in both
regressions. The intercepts only reﬂect the relative weight of the samples in the regression.
On the other hand, sample C appears to be quite different from the other samples. Column
(4) indicates that women are less likely to belong to sample C, as are households with more
children, as well as those with older heads.10
2.3 Non-Parametric Evidence
Recall from Section 2 that the Entry Effects Demonstration aimed at determining whether
IA applicants might be induced to delay their exits from welfare in order to qualify for the
9The administrative ﬁles contain more information on individual characteristics than those reported in the
table. To insure conﬁdentiality of IA claimants, we were only provided information on characteristics reported
in the table.
10We did not report the results using samples A, B and C for the sake of brevity. They are very similar to those
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Figure 2: Kernel Smoothed Hazard Functions – Experimental Groups
(relatively) generous earnings supplement. In order to qualify for the supplement, IA recipi-
ents had to stay on welfare for at least 12 months. Once qualiﬁed, those in sample A had to
ﬁnd a full-time job within 12 months in order to receive the supplement. Those in sample B
continued to receive the standard IA beneﬁt.
Behavioural responsetotheEEDisbestinvestigatedthroughtheuseof hazard andsurvival
functions.11 Figure 2 plots smoothed hazard rates of IA spells for the experimental samples A
and B.12 The ﬁrst noteworthy feature of the ﬁgure is that the treatment sample appears to be
sensitive to the parameters of the EED. Indeed, the hazard rates increases in the ﬁrst 8 months
for both groups upon entry into IA. The hazard rates of the treatment group keep increasing
up until the 25th month while those of the control decrease steadily.13
Weak delayed exit behaviour is evidenced by the difference between the hazard functions
during the ﬁrst 7 months. Indeed, the hazard function of sample A lies below that of sample
B during the ﬁrst 7 months, then crosses it and remains above for the next 30 months or so.
The underlying survival functions are plotted below in Figure 3. Not surprisingly, the survival
11This section only presents brief non-parametricevidenceon non-responsebias in the Applicant Study. More
extensive analyzes using non-parametric permutation tests can be found in Lacroix and Royer (2001).
12Recall that approximately 20% of the sample had been on welfare for at least 2 months prior to randomiza-
tion. If we use ﬁrst month on IA instead of randomization date as the start of the spell, the ﬁgure is basically
unchanged. We use the Epanechnikov kernel with optimal bandwidth to draw the hazard functions.
13The rise in the hazard rates in the ﬁrst few months has been observed in many studies using Canadian data.
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Figure 3: Survival Functions – Experimental Groups
function of sample A lies above that of sample B up until month sixteen. This is consistent
with the ﬁndings of Michalopoulos and Hoy (2001) who have found that the individuals in
sample A were proportionately more numerous to receive IA than those in sample B up until
the 5th quarter of the experiment. Based on Figure 3, it seems reasonable to claim that the
earnings supplement ﬁrst induces individuals to delay their exits in the beginning months
and then provides a relatively strong incentive to leave IA. It is worth investigating though
whether these differences are statistically signiﬁcant. Figure 4 plots the conﬁdence intervals
of the two survival curves. The conﬁdence intervals of both survival functions overlap for
the ﬁrst 24 months. Thus delayed exit from welfare, although evidenced from the survival
functions, seem to lack statistical support. This can be formally tested by means of a simple












































is the estimated survival rate at time
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Figure 4: Conﬁdence Intervals of Survival Functions – Experimental Groups
where












is the number of individuals










. The mean duration of samples A and B over the ﬁrst 12 months are found to be 8.69









test can not reject the null assumption that both durations are equal. This ﬁnding
is similar to that of Berlin et al. (1998) who report an average impact of approximately 3.0%.




















test (=4.38) does reject the null assumption that mean durations are equal.
One could thus conclude that the treatment reduces mean duration by approximately 7.4%.
Eventhoughsuch anestimatedoesnotaccount forindividualcharacteristics, itisveryunlikely
the program impact will be affected by such variables given the results of Tables 3. The more
interesting question that must be addressed is whether our estimates are plagued with non-
response biases. Before we address this question formally, we will present informal evidence
that such biases may be present in the data.
Figure 5 plots the survival functions of samples B, C and D. Notice ﬁrst that the survival
function of group D lies everywhere below that of group B. Standard Log-rank and Wilcoxon
tests strongly reject equality of the two curves. Hence, individuals in sample B have longer
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Figure 5: Survival Functions – Control, Not Contacted and Unsampled Groups
constitute a proper control group since the two differ only insofar as the individuals in the for-
mer (D) were not sampled while those in the latter (B) were sampled and agreed to participate
in the experiment. Yet, the difference between D and B may be partly explained by the fact
that sample D includes individualswith unusually short spells that are excluded from B. Those
are individuals who could not be contacted were they sampled. They probably share similar
characteristics with and behave similarly to those in sample C. Incidentally, the survival func-
tion of sample C lies well below that of sample D. Yet, according to the ﬁgure as many as a
third would have qualiﬁed for the earnings supplement had they been contacted at baseline,
notwithstanding potential delayed exit effects.
The abovediscussionindicatesthat theexperimentalcontrolgrouplikelysuffers fromnon-
response bias. It does not necessarily follow that the comparison between samples A and B
yield a biased estimator of the treatment effect. Indeed, sample A may just as well be plagued
with similar non-response bias that increases mean durations in the same proportion as that of
sample B. In order to measure the program impact correctly, non-response must be modelled
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Figure 6: Welfare Applicants.
3 Modelling Individual Spell Durations
In order to derive an appropriate estimator of the treatment effect, non-response bias must
be explicitly taken into account. The framework within which the experiment took place is
illustrated in Figure 6, which depicts a hypothetical sample of individualsdrawn from the ﬂow
of welfare applicants. The inner circle is the set of those who are sampled with probability
￿ at baseline. Those who in the population are not willing a priori to participate in such an
experiment are located below the dashed line. Likewise, those who could not be contacted
are located in the ellipse. Among the latter, a unknown fraction would agree to be part of the
experiment (above the dashed line) and another unknown fraction would refuse (below the
dashed line).
The treatment group is located inside the inner circle to the left of the vertical line. Mem-
bers of this group have all accepted to participate (above the dashed line) and have been con-
tacted (outside the ellipse). The control group is located inside the inner circle to the right
of the vertical line. The surface between the inner and outer circles is the set of applicants
who were not selected at baseline. This set can be broken down in sets similar to those of the
experimental samples: acceptance, refusal, contacted, non-contacted, etc.
Our task is to model all the information that is available in Figure 6. In order to do this, we
need to determine the probability of belonging to the experimental samples. The experimental
samples comprise 3,315 individuals. According to Statistics Canada, these represent 45% of
all claimants over the enrolment period.15 If we consider those who could not be contacted
as well as those who refused to participate in the experiment, then we can establish that the
15See footnote 8.
11average probability of being sampled each month ranges between 60% and 65%. We will thus









In order to model individual contributions to the likelihood function, we need to deﬁne a























































































are observable depend on which set an individual belongs to.
Only
￿ and
￿ are observable for all individuals.18 Thus, for those in A we know that they

















). Table 3 below
summarizes the realizations of the random variables according to group membership.
3.1 Likelihood function



















to the likelihood function. The con-
tribution can be written conditionally on a vector of exogenous variables,
￿ , and on an un-
16The indeterminacy of the probability of being sampled arises due to some confusion related to sample C.
According to private communications with Statistics Canada, our sample C only includes individuals that could
not be contacted at baseline. In such a case, the probability of being sampled is roughly equal to 65%. If, on
the other hand, the sample includes both those who could not be contacted and those who were not followed up,





















  . The main results are very robust to the choice of
￿ .
17We follow the convention of denoting a random variable by a capital letter and write its realization in lower
case.
18The welfare duration are right censored at 64 months.
12Group E A R T
A 1 1 1 1
B 1 1 1 0
C 1 0,1 0 0
D 0,1 0,1 0,1 0
Table 1: Realizations of random variables
observed heterogeneity factor,
￿ . In order to simplify the presentation, we assume that the
components of










denote the conditional contribution of the realization

























































￿ is a vector
of parameters. When the welfare spell is right censored, the contribution to the conditional
likelihood function is limited to the survivor function of the observed duration.
The random variable
￿ is assumed to be independently and identically distributed across
individuals, and independent of











￿ , the contribution of a realization














































































































is a probability density function and
￿
is the support of
￿ .



















to the likelihood function
is written using the joint distribution of the components of
￿ with the values of the realization
ﬁxed to those observed in the sample for a given individual.
133.2 Modelling Individual Contributions





￿ . Recall that
the probability of being sampled in the experiment is
￿ and that the probability of assignment














as the conditional probability that the individual agrees to participate in the


















































￿ isanormalrandomvariablewithmeanzero and varianceequal to1, and isdistributed
independently of
￿ . In the model,
￿ is an unobserved heterogeneity term. In the participation
equation






































































is the realization of the participation decision, and
￿
￿




IR. We also assume that
￿
￿
￿ is a normal random variable with mean zero and variance




















denote the conditional probability that the individual belongs to the








































































Hence, an individual can be assigned to the treatment group if and only if he/she has been
sampled in the experiment, has agreed to participate and could be contacted.























is a vector of parameters. Therefore, the conditional contribution of a






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































if the individual belongs to group D.19
The contribution of each group to the likelihood function is indicated in Figure 7. Thus
groups A and B contribute sections 1 and 2 (equations (7) and (8), respectively). Likewise,
group C (equation (9)) corresponds to sections 3 and 4. Group D (equation (10)) to sections
5, 6, 7, 8 and 9.
























































19The likelihood function of individuals in sample D is written as if the sample included all the individuals
outside the experiment, i.e. as if sample D was the complement of samples A, B and C. In principles, the
likelihood function should be weighted to account for the fact that sample D is a subsample of those outside the
experiment. As mentioned in footnote 8, sample D comprises over 95% of that population. Further, selection
into the sample was made using a random procedure. We have thus chosen not to weigh the function so as to












































































































































































Estimation of the parameters by means of maximum likelihood requires that we specify the
distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity terms. We will ﬁrst approximate arbitrary con-
tinuous distributions using a ﬁnite number of mass points (see Heckman and Singer (1984)).
Next we will investigate the robustness of the slope parameters using various continuous dis-
tributions.
1. Discrete distributions
20One may question whether there is a unique mapping between these reduced form equations and the struc-
tural model. Note that we have imposed a number of restrictions on the covariance matrix of the reduced form
model. In particular, the dichotomization of the latent variables corresponding to the acceptance and recontact
variables imposes that their variances be normalized to unity. Furthermore,there are no correlations between the
latent variables and the duration variable. It is then then possible to show that a generalizedorder conditionholds
for each latent equation in the conditional model (see Fomby, Hill and Johnson (1984)). It should be noted, how-
ever, that assuming there is no correlation between the latent variables does not imply that they are independent.
Indeed, the conditional expectation of the recontact variable depends on the acceptation decision. Consequently,






￿ are assumed to be independent, the recontact variable
￿
￿






























































IR are parameters and
￿ is the cumulative distribution function of the
normal distribution with mean zero and variance 1.





















The unobserved heterogeneity terms






















probability density function (the pdf of normal or student distributions, for example).
3.4 Speciﬁcation of conditional hazard function




























































is a positive function of the exogenous variables,















is the baseline hazard function. Depending on which version of the model is esti-
mated,






























































￿ are vectors of parameters.








































the conditional hazard function
is constant.21
For uncensored spells, the contribution of the welfare duration is given by the conditional




























































































































































































































































We consider two alternative speciﬁcations for the unobserved heterogeneity distribution.
1. Discrete Distribution








































































served vector of covariates
￿
￿
in (3), and where
￿ is the sample size.
In equation (3)
￿





















































IR is a parameter. The








). The number of mass points
21Note that the hazard function of the Weibull model with parametric unobserved heterogeneity need not be
monotonicin duration. In fact, if the distribution function of the unobservedheterogeneityis Gamma, the hazard
function is non-monotonicand is known as the Singh-Maddala.
22See section 3.1.
18￿
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) are assumed to be speciﬁc to the individual. The parameter estimates are

















































is the simulated contribution of the sequence
￿
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to the likelihood function.

















￿ (see Gourriéroux and Monfort
(1991, 1996)). Under these conditions, this estimator has the same asymptotic dis-
tribution as the standard ML estimator. We have used 1,000 draws from the random
distributions when estimating the models. Using as few as 100 draws yielded essen-
tially the same parameter estimates. Usually, fewer draws are considered adequate (see
Kamionka (1998) and Gilbert et al. (2001)).
3.6 Incomplete Information Schemes
It is possible to examine the impact of the non-response biases on the treatment effect by
considering various estimates obtained using more or less complete information schemes. For
23The data supportonlytwo mass points. This is due to the fact that the individualsin oursample are relatively
homogeneous as shown in Table 2.
24In what follows,
￿ includes









. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure 8: Participants in the experiment who could be contacted.
instance, we can estimate the treatment effect using only the control and the treatment groups
A and B.
Let
￿ deﬁne the conditional density of the welfare durations given the conditioning vari-
ables and the value of the vector of parameters.
1. Treatment and Control Groups










to the likelihood function. They all
agreed to participate and all could be contacted at baseline (see ﬁgure 8).


































































if the individual belongs to B.













are set equal to arbitrary values in the conditional
distribution of the welfare duration).
2. Participants in the experiment











to the likelihood function. All were
selected for the experiment, some could be contacted but others could not be reached
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Not contacted
Figure 9: Participants to the experiment.















































































































































denotes the conditional probability that the individual could not be con-








is ﬁxed to an arbitrary value in this equation and in the
expression of the conditional hazard function).
The expression of the conditional hazard function of the welfare durations is given by






3. Selected and non-selected welfare applicants















to the likelihood function.
Those that were selected at baseline have agreed to participate in the experiment. Those
who were not selected may or may not have agreed (see ﬁgure 10).
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Figure 10: Selected and Non-Selected welfare applicants.















































































































































































is the conditional probability that the individual agrees to participate in







is similar to the one given for the complete
information scheme (see equation (5)).








, for convenience, is ﬁxed to an arbitrary value in the
expression of the conditional hazard).
4 Results
4.1 Single treatment effect
The estimation results presented in Table 4 investigate the overall impact of the treatment on
the average spell duration. Since the experiment’s setup is expected to delay exit prior to
22the qualifying period and to hasten it in the following months, using a single treatment effect
provides a measure of the programs’ net impact. The ﬁrst four columns of the table provide
estimates based on non-parametric unobserved heterogeneity (see equation (11)).25
The estimates of the ﬁrst column are obtained from the experimental samples only. This
speciﬁcation is the only one in which we omit unobserved heterogeneity. This is done for
two reasons. First, given that individuals were randomly assigned to control and treatment
groups, unobserved characteristics should be distributed similarly across groups. Second, the
maximum likelihood estimator of the treatment effect that neglects unobserved heterogeneity
should be relatively close to a simple difference in mean durations between the two groups.
The estimate of
￿ indicates that the hazard function is decreasing with duration. The slope
parameters show that duration increases with the number of children and decreases with age.
Both parameter estimates are highly statistically signiﬁcant. Women are also found to have
longer mean spell durations than men. Finally, the treatment effect is found to reduce spell
duration by approximately 7.5%. This estimate is quite similar to that reported in section 2.3
where it was found that the treatment group had a 7.3% shorter mean duration.
Column 2 of the table reports the results using groups A, B, and C (see Figure 9). The
baseline hazard function is decreasing with duration. As previously, spell duration decreases
with age and increases with the number of children. Likewise, women are found to have
longer spell durations than men. The impact of the treatment is very similar to that of column
(1) although it is not statistically signiﬁcant. Note that the parameter estimate of the contact
binary variable is positive and signiﬁcantly different from zero. This is consistent with the
observation that individualsin sample C have signiﬁcantly shorter spells (see Table 2). Hence,
once we include those that could not be contacted at baseline, the treatment effect vanishes.
The third panel of the table reports the parameter estimates of the probability of not being
contacted at baseline. It is found that the probability is decreasing with age and the number of
children. Women are also less likely not to be contacted than men. These results are consistent
with those obtained for descriptive statistics on sample C (see Table 2).
Column3ofthetable reportstheresultsusinggroupsA,B,and D(see Figure10). Contrary
to the previous cases, the conditional hazard function is increasing with duration. Inclusion
of this group allows us to model explicitly the participation decision. Omission of the latter
thus induces a spurious negative duration dependence. This phenomenon is well known in
duration models. The marginal duration model is the mixture of conditional duration models
with respect of the acceptance decision. The sign of the slope parameters are similar to those
obtained using groups A, B and C. The parameter of the acceptance binary variable is positive
and statistically signiﬁcant. Thus among the individuals that could be contacted a priori,






  . Except for a few speciﬁcations,
￿ could
be estimated freely. The parameter estimates are relatively robust to the estimation of
￿ .
23those who decided to participate have longer mean spell duration. The treatment effect is now
nearly four timesgreater thanthe oneobtainedusingsamplesA andB. Consequently,omission
of the participation decision signiﬁcantly biases the effect of the earning supplement on the
exits from welfare. The second panel of the table reports the parameters of the conditional
probability of agreeing to participate in the experiment. Unfortunately, not a single parameter
is statistically signiﬁcant in this speciﬁcation.
Column 4 of the table reports the results using groups A, B, C and D (see Figure 6). The
parameter estimates show that the conditional hazard function is increasing with duration.
The sign of the slope parameters are similar to those of the previous speciﬁcations. The
impact of the treatment is again nearly four times greater than the one obtained using the
experimental groups only. Spell duration is also longer for participants and for those who
could be contacted. Both parameter estimates are statistically signiﬁcant.
The next two panels indicate that the probability of not being contacted is decreasing with
age, the number of children and is higher for women than for men. The parameters are very
similar those obtained using groups A, B and C. Furthermore, the probability is signiﬁcantly
lower for those who are willing to participate ex ante. Finally, note that the probability of
agreeing to participate increases with age and that the parameter estimate is statistically sig-
niﬁcant at 5%.
The estimates in columns (1)–(4) of Table 4 are based on a rather restrictive speciﬁca-
tion for the unobserved heterogeneity component. Previous research has shown that the slope
parameters of duration models are usually rather insensitive to particular distributional as-
sumptions (see Heckman and Borjas (1980), Bonnal, Fougère and Sérandon (1997), Gilbert
et al. (2001)). It is thus worth investigating whether our results are also robust to various
assumptions pertaining to the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity.
The last four columns of Table 4 report results based on particular parametric distribution
and using samples A, B, C and D. The parameter estimates are thus comparable to those of
column 4. The treatment effect is still sizable although slightly smaller than that of column
(4), except for the speciﬁcation based on the student distribution (with 5 degrees of freedom).
As with column (4), the mean spell duration of those who could be contacted or agreed to
participate in the experiment is considerably longer. Furthermore, the parameter estimates of
the two latent equations are very similar to those of column(4). Thus the estimates of the
treatment effect appears relatively robust with respect to the distribution of the unobserved
heterogeneity.
244.2 Multiple treatment effects
The parameter estimates of the treatment effect presented in Table 4 make no distinction be-
tween the qualifying period and the ensuing months. Yet, the experiment is setup so as to
measure potential delayed exit effects that may arise with a full-scale program. The non-
parametric evidence provided in previous sections suggested that such effects are likely rather
small, if at all signiﬁcant. Our model can easily be modiﬁed to account for potential time-
varying treatment effects. Using the experiment’s design, we have re-estimated the model
by allowing the treatment to have a differentiated impact on the duration at discrete intervals
([0,12[, [12,24[, [24,36[, [36 and more].).
The estimation results are reported in Table 5. The table has the same setup as Table
4. The speciﬁcation in the ﬁrst column uses samples A and B. According to the parameter
estimates, the treatment group does not appear to delay exit any more than the control group
since the parameter estimate of the treatment effect is not statistically different from zero. The
treatment effects for subsequent interval are all highly signiﬁcant. The results indicate that the
treatment effect reduces durations considerably over the [12,24[ and [24,36[ intervals. On the
other hand, the treatment group appears to have longer spells over the [36 and more] interval.
The parameter
￿ indicates that there is negative duration dependence in the data.
The second column reports the estimation results using samples A, B and C. This speciﬁ-
cation yields rather strange results. Indeed, the parameter estimates suggest that the treatment
group has a much longer mean spell duration that the control group. There are no appealing
reasons that may justify such a result, but further investigation certainly seems warranted.
Columns (3) and (4) yield essentially similar results. Contrary to the ﬁrst two speciﬁca-
tions, there now appears to be positive duration dependence in the data. Furthermore, the
parameter estimates suggest there is no evidence of exit delayed behaviour. If anything, the
treatment group has a shorter conditional duration over the [0,12[ interval. Likewise, the
treatment effect over the [12,24[ and [24,36[ intervals reduces duration considerably. In both
cases, it is found that the treatment has no impact on the mean duration over the [36 and more]
interval.
The speciﬁcations in columns (5)–(8) are identical to that of column (4) but use paramet-
ric distributions for the unobserved heterogeneity. The parameter estimates of the treatment
effect are qualitatively similar to those of columns (3) and (4) except they are much smaller in
magnitude. Furthermore, only in column (5) is the treatment found to have an impact on the
duration over the [36 and more] interval.
254.3 Mean Durations
The slope parameters can not directly be interpreted as marginal impacts since the expected
duration is highly non-linear with respect to the covariates.26 We thus report the conditional
(on treatment) expected durations for various model speciﬁcations in Table 6. The top panel
of the table reports the expected durations based on the parameters of the ﬁrst column of Ta-
ble 4. This speciﬁcation allows only one treatment effect and is based on the experimental
samples only. The expected durations are computed by bootstrapping the samples 500 times
and averaging the mean durations across individuals. This allows to integrate over the dis-
tribution of the covariates in the experimental population. The table shows that men have
somewhat shorter durations than women. Likewise, the treatment effect reduces duration by
approximately 6.9% for women, and 7.7% for men.
The middle panel uses the same parameter estimates as the top panel except that the draw-
ing is made within sample D. This allows to measure the impact of differing distributions
of the covariates between the experimental samples and the population of welfare recipients.
The results show that the mean durations are very similar to those of the top panel. This is not
surprising given the results reported in Table 2. If anything, the durations are slightly shorter
when using data from sample D as opposed to the experimental samples.
The bottom panel of the table uses the parameter estimates of the 4th column of Table
5. The treatment effect is allowed to vary with duration and data from all samples are used
to estimates the parameters. To compute mean durations, only data from sample D is used
since this sample best mimics the population of welfare recipients. The table shows that the
treatment is much larger when using the complete model. Indeed, the treatment effect is found
to reduce mean spell duration by as much as 25% for both men and women.
To the extent that our model properly accounts for the non-response bias in the data, one
must conclude that the expected durations of experimental data void of any bias would be
considerably shorter. We conjectured previously that such bias did not necessarily imply that
the impact of the treatment itself would be biased. According to our parameter estimates and
to our simulations, though, it does seem that the estimate is biased.
5 Conclusion
Over the past twenty years experimental designs have become the preferred means of many
by which to evaluate employment and training programs. This is not surprising given that in
an ideal setting social experimentation is able to solve the so-called “evaluation problem”. In




























































26practise, implementation of a demonstration project is likely to be hampered by many logisti-
cal and behavioural problems that may prove detrimental to the quality of the data it generates
(see Hotz (1992)). Although the literature has singled out non-response or randomization bias
as the main culprit, we know surprisingly little about the extent to which demonstrations are
contaminated by these potential problems. The evidence brought to bear is almost always
indirect or inferential at best.
In Canada, a policy aiming at helping single parents on social assistance become self-
reliant wasimplementedonan experimentalbasis. The Self-Sufﬁciency EntryEffects Demon-
stration (EED) focused on newly enrolled recipients. The EED randomly selected a sample of
4,134 single parents who had applied for welfare between January 1994 and March 1995. It
turned out only 3,315 agreed to be part of the experiment despite a 50% chance of receiving a
generous, time-limited,earnings supplement conditionalon ﬁnding a full-time job and leaving
income assistance.
The purpose of this paper is to determine whether a non-response rate as high as 20% is
likely to bias the measurement of the treatment effect. Our empirical strategy is to compare
the estimated impact of the program using experimental data only to those obtained using
additional data on individuals not taking part in the experiment and drawn from the same
population. We identify three reasons for not participating in the experiment. First, some
recipients simply were not selected at baseline. Second, some were selected but refused to
participate. Thirdly, some were selected but could not be reached at baseline. We write the
likelihood of various sets of information and obtain relevant estimates of program impact on
welfare spell durations.
We ﬁnd strong evidence of non-response bias in the data. When we correct for the bias,
we ﬁnd that the estimates of the treatment effect that rely solely on experimental data under-
estimate the true impact of the program. We conjecture this is because those who agreed to
participate have longer mean spell durations and are likely less responsive to ﬁnancial incen-
tives than others. Furthermore, we ﬁnd no evidence of the so-called “delayed exit effect” that
may arise due to the program setup.
Finally, the sensitivity of the parameter estimates to distributional assumptions pertaining
to the unobserved heterogeneity is also investigated. We ﬁnd that many parametric distribu-
tions yield similar results to those obtained from a simple non-parametric model.
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29Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Sample
Variable A B C D
Sex (Women=1) 0.89 0.91 0.86 0.90
(0.31) (0.28) (0.34) (0.30)
Age 32.65 32.37 31.79 32.42
(7.88) (7.41) (7.85) (7.73)
Children 1.65 1.68 1.57 1.65
(0.80) (0.82) (0.77) (0.81)
Mean spell length
￿ 20.28 21.75 13.76 20.34
(0.47) (0.51) (0.75) (0.38)
Median spell length 15 13 4 11
Proportion of censured spells 7.83 10.20 6.59 9.63
No. Observations 1648 1667 637 3073
￿
Estimated from Kaplan-Meir survival rates and tail corrections proposed by
Brown, Hollander and Korwar (1974)Table 3: Logit Regressions
Sample







(0.215) (0.184) (0.186) (0.253)
Sex (Women=1) -0.193 -0.021 0.173 -0.378
￿
(0.122) (0.103) (0.108) (0.135)
Children -0.065 -0.018 0.047 -0.102
￿
￿
(0.044) (0.034) (0.038) (0.057)
Age 0.003 0.004 0.001 -0.013
￿
(0.005) (0.184) (0.004) (0.006)
Observations 3315 4721 4740 3710
Log-Likelihood -2294.5 -3053.3 -3071.5 -1693.6
￿ Statistically signiﬁcant at 5% or better.
￿
￿
￿ Statistically signiﬁcant at
10% or better.Table 4: Maximum Likelihood Estimates: Single Treatment Effect
Non-Parametric Heterogeneity Parametric Heterogeneity
Parameter A + B A+B+C A+B+D A+B+ A+B+ A+B+ A+B+ A+B+
Estimates C+D C+D C+D C+D C+D
Expo- Gamma Log- Student
nential Normal (5)
Duration
￿ 0.873 0.896 1.506 1.382 1.048 1.035 0.983 0.993
(0.013) (0.015) (0.026) (0.024) (0.020) (0.020) (0.016) (0.019)
￿ 0.460 -1.326 -1.246 -0.424 -0.497 -1.499 -1.236
(0.036) (0.039) (0.041) (0.073) (0.074) (0.107) (0.217)
Intercept 2.753 2.027 3.820 2.552 1.493 1.458 1.293 1.109
(0.120) (0.121) (0.149) (0.133) (0.137) (0.134) (0.135) (0.130)
Women 0.198 0.209 0.161 0.213 0.272 0.277 0.222 0.215
(0.064) (0.064) (0.065) (0.062) (0.053) (0.052) (0.047) (0.057)
Age/100 -0.697 -0.776 -1.063 -0.579 -0.988 -0.900 -0.716 -0.605
(0.240) (0.249) (0.251) (0.242) (0.213) (0.207) (0.190) (0.213)
Children 0.203 0.203 0.239 0.269 0.202 0.196 0.187 0.189
(0.052) (0.055) (0.058) (0.058) (0.047) (0.046) (0.043) (0.046)
Treatment -0.075 -0.059 -0.288 -0.294 -0.176 -0.187 -0.186 -0.259
(0.037) (0.042) (0.044) (0.048) (0.037) (0.037) (0.033) (0.036)
Accept 1.148 1.167 1.495 1.560 1.727 1.620
(0.112) (0.086) (0.125) (0.115) (0.115) (0.136)
Contacted 0.810 0.242 0.431 0.336 0.196 0.208
(0.066) (0.077) (0.160) (0.141) (0.160) (0.125)
Acceptance
Intercept 2.026 1.461 1.043 1.046 0.978 0.785
(0.245) (0.201) (0.187) (0.184) (0.182) (0.180)
Women 0.130 0.112 0.180 0.166 0.202 0.232
(0.124) (0.107) (0.100) (0.098) (0.094) (0.098)
Age/100 -0.419 0.402 -0.049 -0.087 -0.162 -0.066
(0.546) (0.443) (0.419) (0.413) (0.407) (0.395)
Children -0.011 0.021 0.031 0.029 0.026 0.024
(0.114) (0.093) (0.090) (0.089) (0.087) (0.085)
Not Contacted
Intercept -0.493 1.860 1.328 1.288 1.039 0.576
(0.154) (0.212) (0.245) (0.243) (0.226) (0.220)
Women -0.288 -0.276 -0.284 -0.297 -0.234 -0.192
(0.085) (0.111) (0.122) (0.118) (0.109) (0.108)
Age/100 -0.988 -0.880 -1.540 -1.463 -1.475 -1.114
(0.085) (0.433) (0.510) (0.512) (0.466) (0.437)
Children -0.140 -0.165 -0.177 -0.176 -0.170 -0.148
(0.078) (0.094) (0.120) (0.115) (0.107) (0.096)
Accepted -3.732 -2.346 -2.279 -1.899 -1.593
(0.122) (0.134) (0.133) (0.132) (0.150)
Likelihood -12 391 -18 522 -33 553 -34 310 -34 427 -34 453 -34 470 34 491Table 5: Maximum Likelihood Estimates: Multiple Treatment Effects
Non-Parametric Heterogeneity Parametric Heterogeneity
Parameter A + B A+B+C A+B+D A+B+ A+B+ A+B+ A+B+ A+B+
Estimates C+D C+D C+D C+D C+D
Expo- Gamma Log- Student
nential Normal (5)
Duration
￿ 0.783 0.880 1.451 1.462 1.111 1.065 1.053 1.008
(0.011) (0.016) (0.031) (0.025) (0.025) (0.021) (0.021) (0.018)
￿ -0.622 1.330 -1.384 -0.214 -0.083 -1.124 -1.479
(0.053) (0.045) (0.038) (0.067) (0.078) (0.093) (0.232)
Intercept 3.061 1.832 3.001 2.763 0.746 0.906 0.803 1.364
(0.141) (0.136) (0.147) (0.131) (0.147) (0.151) (0.163) (0.120)
Women 0.236 0.207 0.172 0.189 0.291 0.263 0.252 0.212
(0.080) (0.067) (0.066) (0.062) (0.058) (0.055) (0.053) (0.056)
Age/100 -0.817 -0.883 -0.765 -0.609 -1.244 -1.034 -0.956 -0.520
(0.303) (0.264) (0.255) (0.239) (0.231) (0.215) (0.210) (0.206)
Children 0.241 0.214 0.283 0.247 0.209 0.200 0.200 0.177
(0.065) (0.059) (0.060) (0.056) (0.050) (0.047) (0.046) (0.045)
Treatment
T
￿ 12 0.074 -0.053 -0.382 -0.329 -0.256 -0.284 -0.290 -0.327
(0.059) (0.046) (0.075) (0.075) (0.048) (0.047) (0.046) (0.049)
12
￿ T
￿ 24 -0.254 1.107 -0.621 -0.634 -0.125 -0.143 -0.149 -0.290
(0.074) (0.101) (0.074) (0.070) (0.062) (0.059) (0.058) (0.055)
24
￿ T
￿ 36 -0.444 1.041 -0.539 -0.529 -0.391 -0.342 -0.326 -0.288






￿ 0.444 0.763 0.103 0.119 -0.249 -0.118 -0.059 0.099
(0.105) (0.080) (0.084) (0.084) (0.099) (0.091) (0.087) (0.086)
Accept 1.240 1.133 1.293 1.517 1.574 1.821
(0.108) (0.094) (0.118) (0.112) (0.111) (0.115)
Contacted 0.642 0.269 0.869 0.695 0.633 0.095
(0.078) (0.078) (0.162) (0.171) (0.184) (0.103)
Acceptance
Intercept 2.031 1.615 0.152 0.448 0.375 0.757
(0.237) (0.198) (0.175) (0.166) (0.167) (0.163)
Women 0.132 0.092 0.205 0.201 0.198 0.234
(0.119) (0.105) (0.093) (0.089) (0.088) (0.090)
Age/100 -0.426 0.405 -0.049 -0.115 -0.133 -0.074
(0.518) (0.440) (0.400) (0.383) (0.382) (0.358)
Children -0.003 0.009 0.011 0.013 0.014 0.031
(0.112) (0.092) (0.085) (0.081) (0.080) (0.079)
Not Contacted
Intercept -0.541 2.021 0.236 0.346 0.220 0.525
(0.164) (0.209) (0.227) (0.213) (0.211) (0.202)
Women -0.312 -0.281 -0.223 -0.226 -0.230 -0.185
(0.091) (0.109) (0.117) (0.108) (0.106) (0.102)
Age/100 -1.023 -0.875 -1.648 -1.531 -1.478 -1.118
(0.376) (0.428) (0.511) (0.472) (0.460) (0.417)
Children -0.152 -0.169 -0.188 -0.169 -0.164 -0.142
(0.083) (0.093) (0.116) (0.107) (0.105) (0.092)
Accepted -4.031 -2.259 -1.847 -1.726 -1.510
(0.117) (0.136) (0.121) (0.125) (0.125)
Likelihood -12 391 -18 499 -25 758 -34 253 -34 387 -34 409 -34 416 -34 457Table 6: Mean Spell Duration
￿





T=0 23.547 24.082 18.568
(0.044) (0.035) (0.091)





T=0 23.490 24.040 18.698
(0.046) (0.034) (0.089)





T=0 26.130 26.417 23.644
(0.019) (0.012) (0.057)
T=1 19.309 19.594 16.836
(0.020) (0.015) (0.054)
￿
Computed on the basis of 500 replications of the relevant samples.
Empirical standard errors in parentheses.
￿
Based on the parameter estimates of column (1), Table 4.
￿
Based on the parameter estimates of column (4), Table 5.